Self-programming

a practice

The self we create is a fiction. On this point, religion and cognitive neuroscience converge. When the machine of a human being is turned on, it seems to produce a protagonist, just as a television produces an image. I think this protagonist, the self, often recognizes that it is a fictional construct, but it also recognizes that thinking of itself as such might cause it to disintegrate.

- Mohsin Hamid, Enduring Love of the Second Person, in Discontent and Its Civilizations

The objective of the exercise is to develop a secular, scientifically-supported, mechanistic project of mental self-regulation by reducing unnecessary self-referential processing, increasing attentional control, and stabilizing affect using what we know from neuroscience, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and established meditation traditions. This practice will avoid gamification, motivational psychology, “journey” framing, spiritual or religious authority, and lifestyle coaching.

Introduction

Evolutionary psychology hypothesizes that humans evolved with hyperactive threat detection, comparatively strong self-model maintenance (the cognitive effort devoted to tracking, stabilizing, and optimizing a self-model oriented largely toward social coordination rather than private experience, especially narrative coherence), and continuous predictive narration. Among other things, these processes create shared epistemological frameworks rather than the interests of an autonomous individual -- arguably the major evolutionary adaptation of Homo sapiens that enables rapid, highly scalable environmental adaptation through social coordination. But for an individual this architecture can, under some circumstances, lead to maladaptive over-activation of the default mode network (DMN, involving medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate, and angular gyrus), excessive socially conditioned self-referential simulation, and attentional capture by internally generated narratives.

As Mohsin Hamid eloquently points out in the quote at the start of this howto, we must also recognize that the mind as we see and experience it -- a central narrator with executive function -- is an illusion. [1] Even our perception is not a direct readout of the world but an active inferential process carried out by neural circuitry, largely outside conscious awareness. George Lakoff and Srini Narayanan write, [2]

The neural mind is surprising if not downright shocking at times. We don't passively see what comes to our eyes, feel what touches our skin, or hear what is presented to our ears. Our neural circuitry takes what is presented to our sensory organs and creates what we see, feel, and hear, mostly unconsciously and not directly or in any simple or straightforward way. In short, much of perception is created, although we are not consciously aware of the creation.

My self-regulation or rebalancing practice attempts to down-regulate DMN dominance, up-regulate attentional and interoceptive control, reduce affective volatility, and direct attention outward. Meditation, stripped of mysticism and religious metaphysics, can be usefully modeled as DMN modulation plus attentional training. However, my goal is not "suppress the DMN" or "flatten affect," a framing that is common in pop psychology. I seek to regulate, not inhibit, DMN activity. The default mode network is also associated with autobiographical memory, mental simulation, conceptual recombination, and counterfactual thinking. These are core components of creativity, especially in intellectually generative activities such as teaching and research. By modulating DMN activity, I seek to enter generative states deliberately, avoiding attention hijacking, unproductive rumination, and affective escalation.

Meditation traditions

Below are several established meditation traditions related to the goals of this practice. While I am interested in learning about these traditions and their techniques, I will avoid devotional, moral, metaphysical, or religious elements in my practice. [3]

Theravāda or Vipassanā meditation

This tradition has a precise phenomenology with the explicit goal of reducing one's identification with mental events. Key practices include Ānāpānasati (breath attention, non-symbolic) and Satipatthāna-style noting (functional labeling of thoughts). In neurophysiological terms, these practices train systems related to meta-awareness, reduction of affective capture, and weakening of self-referential loops. However, many practices are still wrapped in Buddhist ethics and metaphysics.

Zen (especially Sōtō-style shikantaza)

Shikantaza literally means "just sitting," and it refers to a form of meditation without an object, technique, or explicit goal. Zen trains non-interference with mental activity, which paradoxically increases stability. The key practices include sitting with open awareness, avoiding goal-directed manipulation, and immediate noticing of engagement versus disengagement, which refers to recognizing, in real time, whether attention has become actively involved with a thought, perception, or internal narrative, or whether it remains unentangled and simply aware of what is occurring. In neurophysiological terms, the practices train reduced DMN dominance during task engagement, provide a high tolerance of ambiguity, and reduce compulsive evaluation.

Tibetan-derived practices

While most Tibetan practices are explicitly religious, the Dzogchen or Mahāmudrā subset does focus on awareness prior to thought, provides minimal attentional strain, and emphasizes recognition over effort. In neurophysiological terms, it promotes shifts from control to monitoring, reduces narrative elaboration, and is plausibly associated with reductions in DMN dominance, though the empirical evidence is not conclusive. However, many modern presentations are myth-heavy or guru-centric. [4]

A starting practice (15–25 minutes)

1. Attentional grounding (5 minutes)

This phase uses a light external or quasi-external anchor, such as ambient sound, the visual field, or the felt airflow of breathing, to establish attentional stability without effort. The emphasis is not on holding attention tightly but on noticing distraction early and allowing attention to settle naturally.

2. Open monitoring with engagement detection (10–12 minutes)

During this core practice, thoughts, emotions, and sensations are allowed to arise freely while attention tracks its own mode of operation in real time. The only task is to notice when attention becomes engaged in elaboration, simulation, or rehearsal, and when it remains disengaged and aware without continuation, intervening only if engagement becomes compulsive.

3. Affect and body regulation (5–7 minutes)

The session concludes with light bodily and affective regulation through relaxed posture and minimal interoceptive contact with areas such as the jaw, tongue, and shoulders. Slow breathing is introduced only if arousal is elevated, with the goal of supporting faster emotional recovery rather than suppressing emotional intensity or enthusiasm.

While one could practice this at any point in the day, timing does influence what the practice trains. Morning sessions are thought to be effective because cognitive load is lower, habitual engagement patterns are less active, and attentional drift is easier to detect before being swept up in the day’s events. This makes morning practice well suited for calibrating engagement detection and setting a baseline for the rest of the day.

That said, this practice can be done at any consistent time when you are alert but not rushed. Late afternoon or early evening may work well for observing engagement under moderate cognitive and emotional load. The most important factor is regularity and choosing a time when the practice is not immediately followed by high-pressure task switching, allowing its effects to generalize into ongoing activity.

Bibliography

Default Mode Network regulation rather than suppression

Raichle (2015) provides the systems-level account of the Default Mode Network as a metabolically dominant, intrinsically organized network central to internally directed cognition rather than a passive “resting” or task-negative system. Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010) refine this view by fractionating the DMN into distinct subsystems, demonstrating that it is not unitary but functionally differentiated. Mars et al. (2012) further situate the DMN within social cognition, linking it to perspective-taking and the “social brain” rather than idling. Brewer et al. (2011) and Hölzel et al. (2011) show that meditation alters DMN activity and connectivity, supporting modulation and regulatory flexibility without eliminating internally generated thought. Bassett and Gazzaniga (2011) frame such changes not as centralized suppression but as reconfiguration within a complex, distributed system.

Raichle, Marcus E. 2015. “The brain’s default mode network.” Annual Review of Neuroscience 38: 433–447. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-014030.
Andrews-Hanna, J. R., J. S. Reidler, J. Sepulcre, R. Poulin, and R. L. Buckner. 2010. “Functional-anatomic fractionation of the brain’s default network.” Neuron 65 (4): 550–562.
Brewer, J. A., P. D. Worhunsky, J. R. Gray, Y.-Y. Tang, J. Weber, and H. Kober. 2011. “Meditation experience is associated with differences in default mode network activity and connectivity.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (50): 20254–20259.
Hölzel, B. K., S. W. Lazar, T. Gard, Z. Schuman-Olivier, D. R. Vago, and U. Ott. 2011. “How does mindfulness meditation work? Proposing mechanisms of action from a conceptual and neural perspective.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 6 (6): 537–559.
Mars, R. B., F. Neubert, M. Noonan, J. Sallet, I. Toni, and M. F. S. Rushworth. 2012. “On the relationship between the ‘default mode network’ and the ‘social brain.’” Frontiers in Neuroscience 6: 189.
Bassett, D. S., and M. S. Gazzaniga. 2011. “Understanding complexity in the human brain.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (5): 200–209.

Mind-wandering, autobiographical simulation, and creativity

Smallwood and Schooler’s synthesis (2015) establishes mind-wandering as a functional mode of cognition. Baird et al. (2011, 2012) and Franklin et al. (2013) demonstrate links between mind-wandering, positive affect, and creative incubation. Beaty et al. (2014) show that creative cognition depends on dynamic coupling between default and executive networks rather than dominance of either. Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) provides a useful counterpoint, clarifying when unguided wandering becomes maladaptive.

Smallwood, J., and J. W. Schooler. 2015. The Science of Mind Wandering: Empirically Navigating the Stream of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baird, B., J. Smallwood, and J. W. Schooler. 2011. “Back to the future: Autobiographical planning and the functionality of mind-wandering.” Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4): 1604–1611.
Baird, B., J. Smallwood, M. D. Mrazek, J. W. Y. Kam, M. S. Franklin, and J. W. Schooler. 2012. “Inspired by distraction: Mind wandering facilitates creative incubation.” Psychological Science 23 (10): 1117–1122.
Franklin, M. S., M. D. Mrazek, C. L. Anderson, J. Smallwood, A. Kingstone, and J. W. Schooler. 2013. “The silver lining of a mind in the clouds: Interesting musings are associated with positive mood while mind-wandering.” Frontiers in Psychology 4: 583.
Beaty, R. E., M. Benedek, R. W. Wilkins, E. Jauk, A. Fink, P. J. Silvia, D. A. Hodges, K. Koschutnig, and A. C. Neubauer. 2014. “Creativity and the default network: A functional connectivity analysis of the creative brain at rest.” Neuropsychologia 64: 92–98.
Killingsworth, M. A., and D. T. Gilbert. 2010. “A wandering mind is an unhappy mind.” Science 330 (6006): 932.

Social simulation, reputation, and narrative coordination

Spunt and Lieberman (2013) and Ochsner and Lieberman (2001) situate social cognition as largely automatic and simulation-based. Hoffman et al. (2015), Gallo and Yan (2015), and Hilbe et al. (2014) show that cooperation depends on reputational inference rather than direct observation alone. Wiessner (2014) and Dunbar (2014) provide anthropological grounding for narrative and imagination as social coordination tools. Schmälzle et al. (2017) demonstrate that brain network dynamics during interaction reflect real social structure.

Spunt, R. P., and M. D. Lieberman. 2013. “The busy social brain: Evidence for automaticity and control in the neural systems supporting social cognition and action understanding.” Psychological Science 24 (1): 80–86.
Ochsner, K. N., and M. D. Lieberman. 2001. “The emergence of social cognitive neuroscience.” American Psychologist 56 (9): 717–734.
Hoffman, M., E. Yoeli, and M. A. Nowak. 2015. “Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (6): 1727–1732.
Gallo, E., and C. Yan. 2015. “The effects of reputational and social knowledge on cooperation.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (12): 3647–3652.
Hilbe, C., B. Wu, A. Traulsen, and M. A. Nowak. 2014. “Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111 (46): 16425–16430.
Wiessner, P. W. 2014. “Embers of society: Firelight talk among the Ju/’hoansi Bushmen.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111 (39): 14027–14035.
Dunbar, R. I. M. 2014. “How conversations around campfires came to be.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111 (39): 14013–14014.
Schmälzle, R., M. Brook, O. Donnell, J. O. Garcia, C. N. Cascio, J. Bayer, D. S. Bassett, J. M. Vettel, and E. B. Falk. 2017. “Brain connectivity dynamics during social interaction reflect social network structure.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114 (20): 5153–5158.

Affect regulation and embodied self-monitoring

Davidson and Irwin (1999) establish affective style as a regulatory property rather than a fixed trait. Nummenmaa et al. (2014) show that emotions are reliably embodied and interoceptively accessible. Hölzel et al. (2011) and Diamond (2012) link attentional control and affect regulation without invoking suppression. These results support training faster recovery and reduced volatility rather than emotional flattening.

Davidson, R. J., and W. Irwin. 1999. “The functional neuroanatomy of emotion and affective style.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (1): 11–21.
Nummenmaa, L., E. Glerean, R. Hari, and J. K. Hietanen. 2014. “Bodily maps of emotions.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111 (2): 646–651.
Hölzel, B. K., et al. 2011. “How does mindfulness meditation work?” Perspectives on Psychological Science 6 (6): 537–559.
Diamond, A. 2012. “Executive functions.” Annual Review of Psychology 64: 135–168.

Distributed control, lateralization, and limits of a central executive

Vallortigara and Rogers (2020) argue for functional division and parallelism rather than unified control, echoing older critiques of the homunculus model. Mengotti et al. (2020) and Vogel and Machizawa (2004) show capacity limits and specialization in attentional systems. Li et al. (2022) and Carozza et al. (2025) reinforce the view that information processing capacity and white matter organization vary with development and environment, constraining any single regulatory strategy.

Vallortigara, G., and L. J. Rogers. 2020. “A function for the bicameral mind.” Cortex 124: 274–285.
Mengotti, P., A.-S. Kasbauer, G. R. Fink, and S. Vossel. 2020. “Lateralization, functional specialization, and dysfunction of attentional networks.” Cortex 132: 206–222.
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Li, T., Y. Zheng, Z. Wang, D. C. Zhu, J. Ren, T. Liu, and K. Friston. 2022. “Brain information processing capacity modeling.” Scientific Reports 12: 2174.
Carozza, S., I. Kletenik, D. Astle, L. Schwamm, and A. Dhand. 2025. “Whole-brain white matter variation across childhood environments.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 122: e2409985122.

Motivation, incentives, and resistance to gamification

Heyman and Ariely (2004), Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002), and Vohs et al. (2015) demonstrate that extrinsic incentives can undermine intrinsic regulation and distort behavior. Baumeister et al. (2011) and Bargh and Morsella (2008) further weaken the case for conscious, incentive-driven control as the primary driver of action. These findings support a practice design that avoids reward framing, progress narratives, and motivational scaffolding.

Heyman, J., and D. Ariely. 2004. “Effort for payment: A tale of two markets.” Psychological Science 15 (11): 787–793.
Ariely, D., and K. Wertenbroch. 2002. “Procrastination, deadlines, and performance: Self-control by precommitment.” Psychological Science 13 (3): 219–224.
Vohs, K. D., N. L. Mead, and M. R. Goode. 2015. “The psychological consequences of money.” Science 314 (5802): 1154–1156.
Baumeister, R. F., E. J. Masicampo, and K. D. Vohs. 2011. “Do conscious thoughts cause behavior?” Annual Review of Psychology 62: 331–361.
Bargh, J. A., and E. Morsella. 2008. “The unconscious mind.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 3 (1): 73–79.

Notes

Susan Blackmore reinforces Hamid's quote when she writes,

...most of us continue to think of ourselves as a little conscious ‘me’ inside our brain; a ‘me’ who sees the world, makes the decisions, directs the actions and has responsibility for them.
As we shall see later, this view has to be wrong. Whatever the brain is doing it does not seem to need help from an extra, magical self. Various parts of the brain carry on their tasks independently of each other and countless different things are always going on at once. We may feel as though there is a central place inside our heads in to which the sensations come and from which we consciously make the decisions. Yet this place simply does not exist. Clearly, something is very wrong with our ordinary view of our conscious selves. From this confused viewpoint we cannot say with certainty that other animals are not conscious, nor that consciousness is what makes us unique.

In Blackmore, Susan. The Meme Machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
George Lakoff and Srini Narayanan, The Neural Mind. Chicago: The University Chicago Press, 2025.
Of course, when early practitioners discovered these meta-cognitive skills, how else could they interpret or communicate it other than through religious, metaphysical, or moral frameworks? It would be a long time before neuroscience and cognitive models would emerge. The appearance of devotional practices to transmit these skills reveals the mind's ability to coordinate broad social efforts through a shared epistemological narrative. Interestingly, it can also become an engine of social order and control.
That said, I am fond of the works of Milarepa, especially those that inspired the composer Éliane Radigue. We can read or listen to Milarepa's songs as a vivid first-person account of disciplined self-regulation under extreme conditions and careful observations about attention, affect, habit formation, and the destabilization of a rigid self-model through prolonged solitude and austerity. See Milarepa. Drinking the Mountain Stream: Songs of Tibet’s Beloved Saint, Milarepa. Translated by Lama Kunga Rinpoche and Brian Cutillo. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995.